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Proctor: Family Law: Burden of Proof in Child Support Modifications

FAMILY LAW: BURDEN OF PROOF
IN CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION*
Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992)
Petitioner filed a motion to reduce his child, support payments,
alleging an inability to pay.' A dissolution agreement between
petitioner and respondent had established the initial child support
obligation. 2 The trial court denied the motion for modification on the
ground that petitioner had failed to show a substantial change in
circumstances, which is necessary for modification.3 The Florida Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed. 4 On review, the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed s and HELD, that a non-custodial parent who agreed
to the amount of child support will face a heavier burden of proof to
reduce child support in a later modification proceeding. 6
Court modification of a support agreement requires a party to show

a permanent, involuntary, and substantial change in circumstances.7
Although courts may modify a support agreement when a party shows
a sufficient change in circumstances,8 early courts would not modify
an agreement as to a final division of property between the partiesA

*Dedicated to my husband, Gary, with thanks for his unfailing patience.
1. Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992).
2. Id. 2rhe dissolution decree incorporated the parties' settlement agreement, which stipulated the amount of child support. Id.
3. Tietig v. Boggs, 578 So. 2d 838, 839 (3d DCA 1991), affid, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992).
4. Id. at 838.
5. Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251.
6. Id. The instant court did not define exactly what burden of proof the heavier burden
doctrine imposes. Id. Courts generally treat the heavier burden as something beyond the usual
civil burden which requires a preponderance of the evidence. See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498
So. 2d 1270 (Fla.4th DCA 1986).
7. In re Marriage of Johnson, 352 So. 2d 140, 141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The party seeking
modification bears the burden of showing the required change in circumstances. Meltzer v.
Meltzer, 356 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1979).
8. FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1991) provides in relevant part, "[Ejither party may apply to the
circuit court . . . for . . . [a judgment modifying] the amount of support, maintenance, or
alimony, and the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires. . . ." Id.

9. See, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 164 So. 2d 231, 233 (2d DCA), cert. denied, 169 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1964) (referring to an agreement by the husband to pay a weekly sum in exchange for
property rights of the wife, the court said, "[Tihis court may [not] remake a legal agreement
executed in good faith for valid consideration."); Sedell v. Sedell, 100 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1958) (stating that the amount to be paid to the wife could not be modified where it was
"arrived at upon consideration of her agreement to relinquish... property" rights).
865
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This distinction led courts to differentiate between support payments,
which were based on the husband's common law duty to support his
wife, and property payments, which were given in exchange for the
wife's promise to relinquish some or all of her property interests. 0 In
the latter, courts were extremely reluctant to decrease the husband's
obligations, because the promised support had induced the wife to
give up her claim to some of the marital property." Courts expressed
this reluctance by requiring a showing of the "strongest and most
compelling reasons"'12 to justify modifying a payment which the husband promised in exchange for property interests of the wife.1 3 This
requirement of a strong showing became the heavier burden rule.14
Eventually, courts applied the heavier burden rule to alimony
agreements as well as property agreements. 15 In Scott v. Scott,16 for
example, the trial court denied a husband's petition to reduce his
alimony without specifying the grounds for denial.17 The husband appealed on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion.,s The
husband maintained that the wife's recent employment constituted a
significant change in circumstances which justified a reduction in
alimony.' 9 The Florida Second District Court of Appeal disagreed and
affirmed the trial court. 20 The Scott court stated that the former hus-

10. See, e.g., Fort v. Fort, 90 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1956) (stating that a change in circumstances sufficient to modify an alimony payment is not grounds for modifying a settlement
of property rights); Howell, 164 So. 2d at 233 (holding that the court could not remake a property
settlement between the parties).
11. Howell, 164 So. 2d at 233.
12. Sedell, 100 So. 2d at 643.
13. Id.; see also Vance v. Vance, 197 So. 128, 130 (Fla. 1940) (stating that where "a property
settlement provides for an agreed sum ... to be paid the wife in lieu of her" property interest,
a very strong showing was required to modify the sum).
14. See Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
15. See Fowler v. Fowler, 112 So. 2d 411, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) (citing Vance to support
the heavier burden doctrine). The crossover of the heavier burden rule from property payments
to alimony payments is not surprising. It was often difficult for courts to ascertain whether a
promise to make payments was given in exchange for property rights or was based upon a
common law duty to support. See Friedman v. Schneider, 52 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1951).
Dissolution agreements often included periodic payments from one spouse to the other and the
terms of property division. See Vance, 197 So. at 129. It was often unclear whether the payments
were "support," which the court could modify, or periodic payments for property, which the
court could not modify. See id. at 129-30. Therefore, the line separating property payments
from support payments blurred, although the distinction remained in theory. Id.
16. 285 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
17. Id. at 424.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 425.
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band faced a heavier burden of proof to establish the necessary change
in circumstances because he had agreed to the amount of alimony in
a dissolution agreement. 21 Although the Scott court did not define the
heavier burden, it held that the record supported the trial court's
finding that the husband did not meet the burden in this case.'2
Florida courts continued to expand the heavier burden rule, eventually applying it not only to alimony modification, but also to child
support modification.2 In Burdack v. Burdack, the trial court reduced
a father's child support payments because of his inability to pay.? The
Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that
the father had not carried his heavy burden of proof.26 The court cited

Scott for the proposition that a heavier burden rests upon the party
seeking modification when an agreement between the parties set the
amount of support.2 It is unclear whether the court intentionally or
inadvertently transplanted the heavier burden rule from alimony cases
into the area of child support modification.2 Regardless, other Florida
appellate districts followed Burdack and began applying the heavier
burden rule to child support modification.Y

21. Id. at 424-25.
22. Id. at 425. As support for the heavier burden doctrine, the Scott court cited three
cases. Id. These three cases were Ohmes v. Ohnes, 200 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Nixon
v. Nixon, 200 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); and Fowler v. Fowler, 112 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1959). Ohmes and Fowler involved alimony modification, not child support modification.
Ohmes, 200 So. 2d at 849; Fowler, 112 So. 2d at 411. Ohnes applied the heavier burden rule
because in the agreement the wife gave up property interests at the time of the divorce in
exchange for promised support payments. Ohmes, 200 So. 2d at 855-56. Nixon involved both
alimony and child support modification, but the appellate court analyzed only the trial court's
refusal to increase alimony. Nixon, 200 So. 2d at 264. The court applied the heavier burden
rule to the modification of alimony. Id. In Nixon, the wife received an increase in child support
at the trial court level. Id. The wife appealed the award on the ground that the trial court
abused its discretion by not awarding a greater increase in child support. Id. The appellate
court found no abuse of discretion and upheld the trial court's increase in child support. Id.
23. Burdack v. Burdack, 371 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
24. Id. at 529.
25. Id. at 530.
26. Id. at 529.
27. Id.
28. See id.; see also Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
(discussing the adoption of the heavier burden rule into the area of child support modification).
29. Fritz v. Fritz, 485 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Flynn v. Flynn, 433 So. 2d 1037
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983), questioned by Bernstein, 498 So. 2d at 1274; Lacy v. Lacy, 413 So. 2d
472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Bish v. Bish, 404 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Deatherage v.
Deatherage, 395 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
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Although the Fourth District Court of Appeal followed Burdack
in Flynn v. Flynn,3 0 it retreated from this position in Bernstein v.
Bernstein.31 In Bernstein, the custodial parent sought an increase in
child support.32 The trial court denied the motion to increase, based
on its finding that the custodial parent had not sufficiently established
the necessary change in circumstances.3 The trial court applied the
heavier burden rule because the custodial parent agreed to the amount
of child support in a settlement agreement. 4 On appeal, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed, stating that it found the heavier
burden rule inappropriate in child support cases.Explaining its rejection of the heavier burden rule, the Bernstein
court stressed that the best interests of the child are paramount in
child support issues.36 The court noted that the law does not permit
parents to contract away the right of the child to support. 7 It would
be illogical, the court reasoned, to prohibit parents from harming the
child's interests by the terms of a settlement agreement, yet allow
the existence of such an agreement to harm the child's interests.3
The court further explained that the court has the duty to protect
the interests of the child, whereas the parties involved in settlement
negotiation must consider their own interests.3 Therefore, a court-established child support obligation is more likely to provide for the
child's best interests than an agreement between the parties. 40
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court addressed for the
first time the heavier burden rule as applied to child support.41 The
court decided to review the instant case because the Third District
Court of Appeal's decision conflicted with Bernstein.42 The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the Third District Court of Appeal in the

30. 433 So. 2d at 1037.
31. 498 So. 2d at 1273.
32. Id. at 1271.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1274.
36. Id. at 1273.
37. Id. at 1272; see also Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798, 799-800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
(stating that child support is the right of the child which the parents may not contract away).
38. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d at 1272.
39. Id. at 1273.
40.

Id.

41. See Tietig, 602 So. 2d 1250-51.
42. Id. at 1250.
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instant case.4 The instant court upheld the heavier burden rule when
a party who agreed to the amount of child support later sought to
reduce the amount.- However, the instant court also adopted the
rationale of Bernstein by stating that courts should not require a
heavier burden of proof in cases where a party seeks an increase in
45

child support.

The instant court explained that when a case involves a petition
to increase child support, a court's application of the heavier burden
rule might impair the best interests of the child. 46 The instant court
noted that parties negotiating a dissolution agreement often consider
factors other than the child's best interests. 47 Therefore, the instant
court concluded that in cases where a party seeks an increase in child
support, the burden of proof should be a preponderance of the evidence, regardless of whether the amount of child support was set by
agreement or by the court.4
The Florida Supreme Court distinguished the instant case from
Bernstein because petitioner in the instant case was seeking a reduction in child support. 49 The instant court stated that in cases where a

party seeks to reduce child support, the heavier burden rule does not
impair the best interests of the child 0 Because lower support payments are never in the child's best interests, the instant court
explained that no reason existed to abandon the heavier burden rule
in cases where a party seeks to reduce child support.5 ' Therefore, the
burden of proof which now applies to a party seeking child support
modification depends upon two factors. These factors are whether the
parties agreed to the initial amount of child support, and whether the

48. Id. at 1251.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The instant court noted the possibility that "parties might place their own interests
ahead of those of their children in crafting a settlement agreement." Id. In addressing this
concern, the Bernstein court stated that child support can become "just another poker chip in
the give-and-take of settlement negotiations." Bernstein, 498 So. 2d at 1273. The Bernstein
court further stated that such things as tax incentives, property division, and ill-will between
the parties can lead to an agreement between the parents that may not be in the child's best
interests. Id.
48. See Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251-52.
49. Id. at 1251.
50. Id.
51. Id. The court stated that in a proceeding where a decrease in child support is sought,
the "best interests of the children could not be jeopardized" by the heavier burden rule. Id.
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party seeking modification wants to increase or decrease the amount
of support. 52 Under the instant holding, the heavier burden of proof
applies only when the parties agreed to the amount of child support
in a dissolution settlement and the non-custodial parent later seeks to
reduce child support.53 If the court set the initial child support, or if
the custodial parent seeks to increase child support, the court will
require the parent to meet the usual civil burden of proof.The instant decision fashioned a compromise between Bernstein
and Burdack.55 Under Bernstein, the heavier burden rule did not apply
to child support modification, regardless of whether the parties had
agreed to the child support.- Under Burdack, the heavier burden rule
applied to both increases and decreases in child support if the parties
had agreed to the initial amount of child support.5 7
By rejecting both the Bernstein and Burdack rules, the instant
court sought to protect the best interests of the child.5 The instant
decision accomplishes that goal for children of divorced parents. 59
Based on the instant court's holding, custodial parents who agreed to
child support amounts will find it somewhat easier to successfully
petition for increases in child support.- This is because the instant

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the burden of proof is the
usual civil burden of a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1252 (Overton, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 1251.
56. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d at 1273-74.
57. Burdack, 371 So. 2d at 529.
58. Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251. The instant court examined the policy, expressed in Bernstein,
of protecting the child's best interests, and concluded that removing the heavier burden of proof
requirement from parties seeking increased child support adequately protected the child. Id.
59. See id. The instant holding is more favorable to children of currently divorced parents
than either Bernstein or Burdack. The instant holding removes the heavier burden barrier to
child support increases which had existed under Burdack and provides children greater protection
from decreases in child support than existed under Bernstein. Compare id. (holding that a
heavier burden is inapplicable to increases) with Burdack, 371 So. 2d at 529 (holding that a
heavier burden is applicable to any modification if the initial amount was based on the agreement
of the parties) and Bernstein, 498 So. 2d at 1273 (holding that a heavier burden is inapplicable
to decreases if the initial amount was based on the agreement of the parties).
60. See Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251. Prior to the instant holding, four of the five districts in
Florida followed Burdack in applying a heavier burden to modify child support when the parties
had agreed upon the initial amount of support. See Fritz v. Fritz, 485 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA
1986); Lacy v. Lacy, 413 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Bish v. Bish, 404 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981); Deatherage v. Deatherage, 395 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The instant holding
makes it easier for custodial parents to increase support because courts will no longer impose
a heavier burden of proof for petitions to increase child support, even when the parties agreed
to the initial child support. Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251.
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decision renders the heavier burden rule inapplicable to increases in
child support, regardless of whether the parties agreed to the amount
of support.6 1 At the same time, the instant decision protects children
of divorced parents by maling it more difficult for a parent to convince
a court to reduce child support payments.62 Therefore, the instant
holding should lead to increases in the average support for children
whose parents have already divorced.6 Because courts presume
greater child support to be in the child's best interest,6 the instant
decision will enhance the interests of children whose parents are already divorced.
However, the instant decision may have an unanticipated effect
upon children whose parents will divorce in the future. This is because
non-custodial parents have less. incentive to enter dissolution agreements under the instant holding than they would under either Bernstein or Burdack.6 Under Bernstein, courts should completely remove
the heavier burden doctrine from child support modification.r Because
Bernstein applied the same burden of proof to parties regardless of
whether they settled,6 settling neither increased nor decreased the
probability of success in a potential modification hearing. Thus, the
Bernstein rule neither encouraged nor discouraged settlement.
Prior to the instant holding, four out of five Florida districts followed the Burdack rule. 68 Under Burdack, the heavier burden rule

6;. Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251.
62. Id. Children of divorced parents who entered a settlement agreement are less likely
to face reduced child support under the instant holding than under Bernstein. Under the instant
holding, the heavier burden applies to decreases in support, thus making it more difficult to
decrease child support. Id. Under Bernstein, the heavier burden did not apply to child support
modifications at all. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d at 1273.
63. Presumably, a custodial parent who could not have met the heavier burden of proof
required under Burdack may be able to meet the preponderance of the evidence burden and
obtain an increase in child support under the instant court's holding. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text. Similarly, a non-custodial parent who could have petitioned successfully for
a reduction in child support under Bernstein's preponderance burden may be unsuccessful under
the heavier burden which the instant holding imposes. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text. Some children will receive higher child support under the instant holding, and thus average
child support will increase.
64. See Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251-52.
65. See id. at 1252 (Overton, J., dissenting). Justice Overton stated, in a dissenting opinion
with which Chief Justice Shaw concurred, that the majority holding was contrary to the public
policy of encouraging early settlements of family disputes. Id.
66. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d at 1273.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 60.
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applied to petitions for both increases and decreases in child support
when the parties had settled.69 Thus, the rule acted as a shield for

both parties. Although the Burdack rule made it more difficult for
either party to modify child support, it also protected each party from

unwanted modification by the other.70 Because the prospect of settlement presented both advantages and disadvantages to both parties,
the Burdack rule neither encouraged nor discouraged settlement.

However, under the instant holding, a non-custodial parent who
settles will face a heavier burden to decrease support in the future
than if the court had set the amount of child support. 71 Still, settlement
will not impose the same increased burden upon the custodial parent
in any future attempt to increase child support.- Thus, while non-custodial parents have an additional cost from settling, no corresponding

benefit exists. 3 As a result, non-custodial parents have less incentive
to settle under the instant holding than under either Bernstein or
Burdack.7 4

This decrease in the non-custodial parent's incentive to settle may
actually harm children whose parents divorce in the future. To the
extent that the change in incentive decreases the number of dissolution

69. Burdack, 371 So. 2d at 529.
70. See id.
71. Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1252 (Overton, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1251.
73. See id. at 1252 (Overton, J., dissenting). The new cost of settling which the instant
holding imposes on non-custodial parents is matched by a corresponding benefit to custodial
parents. Under the instant holding, the custodial parent who settles faces the same burden of
proof to increase child support that would have existed absent a settlement agreement. Id. at
1251. However, custodial parents who settle get the protection of a heavier burden of proof
imposed on the non-custodial parent who later seeks to decrease child support. See id. Thus,
custodial parents have an increased incentive to settle under the instant holding. See id.
74. Compare Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the heavier burden
applies only when the non-custodial parent seeks to decrease child support and the parties
agreed to the initial amount of child support) with Bernstein v. Bernstein, 498 So. 2d 1270 (Fla.
4th DCA 1987) (refusing to apply the heavier burden to child support modification regardless
of earlier agreement between the parties) and Burdack v. Burdack, 371 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1979) (applying the heavier burden to child support modification proceeding where the
parties set the initial amount in a settlement agreement). While non-custodial parents have less
incentive to settle under the instant decision, custodial parents may actually have an increased
incentive to settle. This is because the heavier burden, which makes settlement less attractive
to non-custodial parents, protects custodial parents who settle from later decreases in child
support unless the non-custodial parent can meet the heavier burden of proof required. See
supra note 63.
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settlements, 75 the change will hurt the best interests of children.76 The
strain of contested dissolution proceedings takes an emotional toll on
children. 7 Additionally, litigation is financially burdensome. 78 Court
costs and attorney fees will deplete family resources, leaving less for the
court to divide between the parties. 7 This means that all members of
the family suffer an unnecessary financial harm, including the children.
To the extent that parties continue to reach dissolution agreements
under the instant holding, the decrease in the non-custodial parent's
incentive to settle is likely to affect the terms of those agreements.80
As the parties negotiate the terms of a settlement agreement, incentives to settle affect the balance of power between the parties."' Under
the instant holding, the non-custodial parent will have more bargaining
power; whereas, the custodial parent's bargaining power will decrease 2 This is because the instant holding makes the custodial parent
more eager to settle, but makes the non-custodial parent less eager
to settle. Thus, the non-custodial parent is in a position to demand

75. The instant holding could result in fewer total settlements because it gives non-custodial
parents less incentive to settle. Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1252 (Overton, J., dissenting). However,
because the instant holding also gives custodial parents a greater incentive to settle, see supra
note 73, it is difficult to predict the net impact, if any, upon the number of settlements.
76. See Sally B. Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence:The Elevation of FormOver Substance
in the Treatment of Separation Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C.L. REV. 319, 319-20
(1991); see also Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1252 (Overton, J., dissenting) (stating that early settlement
of family disputes is more beneficial to the family than contested proceedings); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Rational Decision Making About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 27 (1990)
(discussing the effects of divorce on children).
77. See supra note 76; see also Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Preparingthe Clientfor Successful
Negotiation,Mediationand Litigation, in NEGOTIATING TO SEITLEMENT IN DIVORCE 6 (1985)
(stating that litigation is more stressful than negotiating a settlement agreement).
78. IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 676 (1986).
79. See id.
80. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966-68 (1979).
81. See id. Professors Mnookin and Kornhauser characterize the outcome which the law
will impose if the parties do not settle as bargaining chips or legal endowments. Id. at 966,
968. These endowments affect the outcomes which the parties are willing to accept, and as such
the bargaining position or power of each party. See id. at 968-69.
82. A party who expects a better outcome from refusing to settle and going to trial is in
a stronger bargaining position. See id. Since the non-custodial parent will face the heavier
burden in future modification of child support only if a settlement is reached, the non-custodial
parent has less to lose by going to trial. See supratext accompanying notes 71-74. This places
the non-custodial parent in a position to demand additional concessions from the custodial parent
in exchange for signing the settlement agreement. See supra note 81.
83. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

additional favorable terms from the custodial parent in exchange for
the latter's willingness to sign an agreement and avoid a court battle. 84
In other words, a settlement agreement which was marginally
attractive enough to induce the non-custodial parent to sign under
Bernstein or Burdack will no longer be enough to induce the non-custodial parent to sign . Therefore, the custodial parent must give additional concessions to make the settlement agreement as attractive
to the non-custodial parent under the instant decision as it would have
been under either Bernstein or Burdack.A Thus, the instant court's
holding will tend to alter the terms of settlement agreements. 7 Such
agreements will become more beneficial to non-custodial parents and
less beneficial to custodial parents and their children. For the children
whose parents will negotiate dissolution agreements in the future, this
translates into fewer tangible benefits during childhood and adolescence.88
The instant court recognized that the child's best interest is
paramount in actions to modify child support.8 9 The instant court's
decision safeguards the best interests of those children whose parents
are already divorced by imposing a heavier burden of proof only upon
a party seeking to reduce child support.- However, the effect of the
instant holding may be to impair the interests of children whose parents will divorce in the future. Because the instant holding changes
the incentives of the parties to settle, 91 it may adversely affect children

84. See supra note 82.
85. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. Non-custodial parents are less willing to
settle because the instant holding imposes the cost of a heavier burden to decrease child support
upon the party who settles, but no heavier burden applies if the non-custodial parent allows
the court to establish child support. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
86. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
190-201 (4th ed. 1977) (explaining utility theory which states that an individual who loses one
benefit can be made equally well off only if some other benefit of equal subjective value replaces
the lost benefit).
87. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 80.
88. Although children of parents who divorce in the future will receive fewer tangible
benefits as a result of the instant holding, they may receive increased intangible benefits. In
exchange for a lower child support amount or a poorer custodial parent, the child receives
increased security in terms of a reduced risk that child support will be decreased in the future.
See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
89. Tietig, 602 So. 2d at 1251.
90. Id.
91.

See id. at 1252 (Overton, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/7

10

Proctor: Family Law: Burden of Proof in Child Support Modifications
1992]

CASE COMMENTS

875

in two ways. First, it may decrease the number of settlements, increasing the emotional and financial strain on families in divorce proceedings. 9 - Second, by changing the bargaining positions of divorcing parties, it may lead to less favorable settlement terms for custodial parents.9 3 Terms which are less favorable to custodial parents necessarily
harm the children. The instant holding may therefore impair rather
than enhance the interests of children in Florida.
Sharon Proctor

92.
93.

Scott, supra note 76, at 29, 33.
See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 80, at 968.
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